Using supervised machine learning algorithms to detect suspicious URLs in online social networks by Al-Janabi, MF et al.
Using supervised machine learning algorithms to 
detect suspicious URLs in online social networks 
Mohammed Al-Janabi 
Keele University 
m.f.al-janabi@keele.ac.uk.com 
Ed de Quincey 
Keele University 
e.de.quincey@keele.ac.uk 
Peter Andras 
Keele University 
p.andras@keele.ac.uk
 
 
Abstract– The increasing volume of malicious content in social 
networks requires automated methods to detect and eliminate 
such content. This paper describes a supervised machine learning 
classification model that has been built to detect the distribution 
of malicious content in online social networks (ONSs). Multisource 
features have been used to detect social network posts that contain 
malicious Uniform Resource Locators (URLs). These URLs could 
direct users to websites that contain malicious content, drive-by 
download attacks, phishing, spam, and scams. For the data collec-
tion stage, the Twitter streaming application programming inter-
face (API) was used and VirusTotal was used for labelling the da-
taset. A random forest classification model was used with a com-
bination of features derived from a range of sources. The random 
forest model without any tuning and feature selection produced a 
recall value of 0.89. After further investigation and applying pa-
rameter tuning and feature selection methods, however, we were 
able to improve the classifier performance to 0.92 in recall.  
Keywords-– Twitter; malicious URLs; phishing; spam; random 
forest; spam detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The main challenges for social network security administra-
tors are not only protecting the social network management sys-
tem and database, but also protecting OSN users from being ex-
posed to malicious content that is spread over those social net-
works. 60% of social network users have received or been ex-
posed to malicious content [1] such as spam, scams, and drive-
by downloads. A number of OSNs are now developing mali-
cious content detection systems for such attacks e.g. the Face-
book Immune System detects suspicious activities such as like-
jacking, social bots, and fake content [2].  
Social network detection systems vary in their robustness 
yet are quite similar in their detection techniques. Examples of 
popular detection techniques used are blacklists and machine 
learning-based classifiers. Blacklists, which are considered one 
of the traditional techniques used in this field, are databases that 
collect records of previously detected attacks that have been re-
ported either by users or by security communities. Usually, 
blacklists are considered as the first defensive line that OSNs 
use for protection. For example, Twitter uses Google 
Safebrowsing1 in particular as a blacklist service [3]. In addition 
to Safebrowsing, the other well-known blacklist services in-
clude PhishTank2, URIBL and SURBL. The blacklist technique 
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offers real-time detection with a low false positive rate [4]; 
however, blacklist techniques cannot detect URLs that have not 
been included explicitly in these blacklists. Spammers therefore 
can exploit the time gap between spreading unknown URLs and 
the time required for the blacklists to be updated [5]. This is 
achieved by creating URLs with no historical profile via URL-
shortening[6] and low-cost domain registration and hosting ser-
vices [7]. The consequence to users is that they are exposed to 
links to malicious content in real-time, with spam campaigns 
achieving 80% of their spreading target within the first 24 hours 
[5]. 
Due to this weakness of blacklists and the sheer volume and 
complexity of data exchanged in OSNs, automated procedures 
for identifying malicious content are essential [8]. The majority 
of studies [9][10][11] that have attempted to mitigate malicious 
content in social networks have built efficient machine learning 
classifiers that can classify unseen malicious URLs into spam 
or benign with the minimum amount of human intervention. 
However, training these classifiers with an appropriate dataset 
is non-trivial [12][13], with an adequate training dataset needed 
to build an accurate supervised machine learning model. Black-
lists can be used to provide a large set of labelled records of 
previously identified malicious URLs, which will be used to 
train the classifiers. 
Recent studies have compared several machine learning al-
gorithms to select the best algorithm for their collected dataset. 
They used mainly supervised machine learning algorithms for 
spam classification, such as Naïve Bayes (NB), k-Nearest 
Neighbors (k-NN), Random Forest (RF), and Logistic Regres-
sion (LR).  
Most studies [11][14] conclude that RF gives a higher clas-
sification performance than the other supervised machine learn-
ing algorithms. However, in these studies specific details re-
lated to which algorithm parameters or feature selection meth-
ods were used are often not provided. This absence of infor-
mation means that it is not possible to build an equivalent model 
to reproduce the results.  
In this study, the RF classifier has been used to investigate 
how its performance can be optimized further by using feature 
selection and parameter tuning. For feature selection, we aimed 
to determine the most effective features that were derived from 
multiple sources, as previous studies [15] suggested that classi-
fiers that are based on a multisource of features can give better 
2https://www.phishtank.com/ 
classification performance. For parameter tuning we aimed to 
determine the best setting for the number of trees, the size of 
leaf nodes and the depth of the trees in the RF classifier. How-
ever the purpose of this paper is not to compare RF with other 
methods, but to demonstrate a way of systematically analysing 
the application of RF to spam twitter detection and to highlight 
the importance of appropriate statistical analysis in the process 
of setting the RF parameters. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II, re-
views the related work. In Section III, we describe the data that 
we used. In Section IV, we discuss model enhancement meth-
ods. Section V contains the discussion of the results, our con-
clusions and indications of the planned future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The majority of studies in this area aim to find the most pre-
dictive features that they can acquire and the best algorithm to 
develop a classifier model [16]. Researchers in this field focus 
mainly on finding novel features with high discriminative 
power in addition to coming up with the most accurate machine 
learning model [17]. Finding high discriminative features in the 
area of Internet security and social networks is quite a challenge 
due to the variation in attacks and techniques used by 
spammers.  
Due to the inventiveness of spammers detection systems are 
bypassed after some time and the set of features used for spam 
detection has to be regularly revised [18][19]. Similar to how 
security researchers study the attacks, spammers and hackers 
investigate detection systems; therefore, they can change user 
properties, content or the distribution mechanism to bypass cer-
tain restriction or detection rules [20]. For example, a study of 
detecting spam on Twitter [21] recommended that the number 
of followers is one of the highest discriminative power features. 
The feature’s discriminative power has been increasingly weak-
ened though by spammers making their accounts more popular. 
They do this by conducting spam campaigns that make their 
“fake” accounts connect with other fake accounts, increasing 
the follower and following numbers [22]. 
TABLE I.  COMMON FEATURES USED IN LITERATURE 
Feature Features Description Ref 
Account age Number of days since account 
created 
[21][11] 
No of followers Number of accounts connected to 
this account 
[21][11][25] 
No following Number of accounts connected to 
this account 
[21][11][25] 
No of user favorites Number of favorite tweets [21] 
No of tweets Number of posted tweets [21][11][25] 
The majority of previous studies [23][24][21]  begin by col-
lecting data using the Twitter streaming API3. Multiple features 
are then extracted and different feature sets utilized. Some stud-
ies have common features, and often these are features that do 
not require a preprocessing stage as they are provided by Twit-
ter in a numerical format e.g. tweets number and number of fol-
lowers. These can then be deployed directly into a machine 
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learning algorithm. Table I shows examples of common fea-
tures that have been used in previous studies [21][11].  
Chen et al. [21] used 12 Twitter-only lightweight features. 
Lightweight features are those that do not require complicated 
preprocessing operations or significant resource to be extracted 
e.g. age of account and number of followers. They compared 
six different classification algorithms – BayesNet, Naive Bayes, 
Decision Tree (C4.5), RF, k-NN, and support vector machines 
(SVMs) – which are ordered here in terms of their F-measure 
scores. RF had the highest performance at 93.6% in the F-meas-
ure using an evenly distributed dataset. In the case of highly 
imbalanced datasets, however, such as a 1:19 ratio for 
spam/non-spam, the performance dropped to 56.6%. Classifiers 
that have been trained on imbalanced data are more likely to be 
subject to bias by majority class results.  
Blum et al. [24] focused on detecting fraudsters’ methods to 
get users to click on links that are designed to be similar to the 
websites they trust or use. They used only URL lexical features. 
The features were presented as a bag of words after splitting 
URLs into three text strings: protocol, domain, and path. The 
advantages of this detection method are the lightweight data ac-
quisition and the speed of implementation. 
Burnap et al. [23] used an entirely different method to detect 
malicious URLs. They deployed a high-interaction honey-net4 
to collect system state changes, such as the sending/receiving 
packets and CPU usage. The training dataset contained 2,000 
examples with a 1:1 ratio for spam/non-spam. Ten attributes 
were used to build a classifier that reflected system status 
changes after opening the tweet's URL. Burnap et al. investi-
gated the shortest time required to give a preliminary warning 
of the existence of malicious content in a particular URL. The 
best result was reported for Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) using 
features acquired after 210 seconds (0.723 in the F-measure 
metric). The features used by Burnap et al. require complex data 
analysis; however, they make it difficult for spammer sites to 
disguise their true nature. 
Although the recent literature has compared several algo-
rithms, there is a lack of information about important stages in 
building a machine learning model. In particular, little infor-
mation is provided about how feature selection methods are 
managed and how parameter tuning is conducted. We address 
this issue in Section IV. 
III. STUDY METHODOLOGY 
This section describes in detail the main stages of this study, 
starting with the data collection and labelling of the dataset, fol-
lowed by a brief comparison of the most common algorithms 
used in related studies.  
A. Data collection and labelling 
This section explains how the data collection process was 
conducted and how we built the ground truth dataset of mali-
cious and benign tweets. The data collection involved three 
steps, as shown in Figure I: (i) collecting tweets that have 
URLs, (ii) crawling each URL using headless Selenium brows-
ers, and (iii) labelling the tweet's URLs as malicious or benign. 
4https://www.honeynet.org/ 
For the data collection stage, we used Twitter's public 
streaming API for tweet collection that gives access to 1% of 
the total stream [23]. A Python script was written to connect to 
the Twitter API and retrieve tweets that contained at least one 
URL. The tweets were then stored in a MongoDB5 database. 
Two million tweets were collected between June 15, 2016, and 
August 14, 2016, at random times of the day. Figure I shows 
the collection stage of tweets, starting by connecting to the 
Twitter stream API, then applying the filter rule to limit to 
tweets with URLs. 
 
Fig. 1. Data collection and labelling stage 
When building a supervised machine learning model, a la-
belled dataset is needed. In this study, this meant labelling each 
tweet in the dataset as either “spam” or as a “normal” tweet. To 
build this ground truth dataset, the tweets’ URLs were checked 
using VirusTotal6. VirusTotal is a multisource online database 
that is used to check whether a particular URL exists in any 
blacklist database. VirusTotal provides an API for retrieving in-
formation about URLs using up to 50 reputable online black-
lists, such as Google Safebrowsing (Google), BitDefender, 
Dr.Web Link Scanner, Kaspersky URL Advisor (Kaspersky), 
PhishTank (OpenDNS), Spam404, and Trend Micro Site Safety 
Center (Trend Micro7). 
As an additional refinement stage, each benign example in 
our dataset, i.e. a tweet containing a URL that was not black-
listed, was checked to determine whether they had been deleted 
by Twitter as this may indicate tweets that they contained mali-
cious URLs that are not on a blacklist. According to Twitter’s 
deletion rules8, there are three major reasons to eliminate a 
user’s9 tweet: breaking copyrights, abusive tweeting activity, 
and that it is spam from Twitter’s perspective. In order to check 
if a tweet had been deleted, the twitter streaming API was used 
to retrieve a specific tweet (using its ID). If nothing was re-
trieved via the API then we consider it as deleted. This proce-
dure was conducted several times during data collection, the 
last checking was done in December 2016. 
We removed the deleted tweets from our dataset to elimi-
nate from the dataset any tweet that could be deleted because it 
is spam or considered to be malicious. As a result, we were able 
to create 150,000 examples of ground truth data, divided into 
120,000 non-spam examples and 30,000 malicious examples, 
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which ranged from malware, phishing, scam pages, and over-
loaded ads to low-quality web pages. We also validated our da-
taset periodically using the two methods mentioned above, as 
some spam URLs required longer time to be blacklisted or de-
leted by Twitter. 
In addition to the collected tweets, we stored the content of 
each webpage that the tweet’s URL led to. For this purpose, we 
used headless browsers to open each link and catch page load-
ing behaviors such as the redirection hubs and get the final 
landed webpage. We used a high speed connected machine and 
high processing speed to retrieve all URLs in our dataset. We 
set up the headless browsers on a Core i7 32GB RAM machine 
to visit each tweet's URL to collect additional source data. We 
extracted web page content and URL redirection behavior. To 
determine the domain age, we used the WHOIS info API to ac-
quire information about the domain's registration date. 
B. Feature extraction and engineering 
In the context of machine learning, features are used to pro-
vide discriminative power in the classification process. The pre-
liminary feature set used was based on the literature  [11], and 
also contained features selected by studying cases of real spam-
ming content distributed over OSNs. A total of 36 features were 
extracted from the Twitter stream API, domain information, 
and web page content. Table II shows features that were ex-
tracted directly from the tweet's metadata, provided by the 
Twitter streaming API. These can be considered as lightweight 
features as they do not need further pre-processing. 
TABLE II.  TWITTER FEATURES READY TO BE USED  
Feature Feature Source 
User name signs User Info 
Default profile image User Info 
Have media Tweet Content 
User listed count User Info 
User followers count User Info 
User friends count User Info 
User favorites count User Info 
User name length User Info 
Account age User Info 
Is user geo-enabled? User Info 
User statuses count User Info 
User name digits (number) User Info 
 
Models that rely entirely on Twitter metadata features 
though [26][27] could be subverted by spammers using tech-
niques such as having fake followers [28], that make their spam 
user accounts look more legitimate. Therefore, to make this 
more difficult for spammers to subvert, a more powerful feature 
set is required. Recent studies [23], [29] recommend using fea-
tures that are derived from several sources, such as domain 
WHOIS info and web page content. These features, shown in 
Table III though require resource intensive preprocessing (see 
8https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311 
9There is also the chance that the user themselves deletes the tweet. 
previous section) to be extracted and converted for use in ma-
chine learning algorithms. Table VII shows the full list of fea-
tures that were used for building the machine learning models 
used in this study.  
TABLE III.  FEATURES THAT REQUIRED EXTRACTION AND 
PREPROCESSING 
Feature Feature Source 
Domain age Domain WHOIS Info 
Is it secured https? User Info 
Link length Tweet Content 
Link letters (number) URL Info (after redirection) 
Number of dots in link URL Info (after redirection) 
Number of link signs URL Info (after redirection) 
Number of digits in link URL Info (after redirection) 
User name length User Info 
Number of input forms Web Page Content 
Number of external links Web Page Content 
Number of ad blocked10 links Web Page Content 
Number of webpage links Web Page Content 
C. Model selection 
To explore the best-performance machine learning algo-
rithms for the classification of spam and non-spam URLs asso-
ciated with tweets, the top four common algorithms reported in 
the literature review (see section 2) were used. These algo-
rithms are:  
LR classifier: a probabilistic classifier, typically working on bi-
nary classification problems 
RF: one of the ensemble classification techniques. RF builds 
many decision trees that are used to classify new data by the 
majority vote. RF shows good generalization due to the random 
sampling and random selection of features.  
NB: one of the commonly used learning algorithms. The NB 
classifier is a probabilistic model based on the Bayes rule. ‘Na-
ïve’ refers to the assumption of conditional independence 
among features. 
k-NN: a supervised learning method used in classification prob-
lems. k-NN maps the training input feature vectors X = {x_1, 
x_2, ..,x_n} in n-dimensional space, then classifies new data 
based on the majority class for the k neighbors. k refers to the 
number of training samples closest to the point of entry.  
 All the algorithms above were implemented in this study by 
using Scikit-learn11, which is an open source machine learning 
library in Python. 
We trained and tested four classifiers using the same set of 
36 features and the same training and testing datasets described 
in Section III.B. The ground truth dataset was randomly divided 
into a 75% training and 25% testing set. The four classifiers 
(RF, LR, k-NN, and NB) were trained and tested. We used the 
Scikit-learn default parameter values for all four algorithms. To 
assess performance, evaluation metrics were used that are 
known to be less sensitive to dataset imbalance [30]:  
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TABLE IV.  RANDOM FOREST MAIN PARAMETERS 
Data Set 
Classifier decision 
SPAM Not SPAM 
T
ru
e Spam True Positive False Negative 
Not SPAM False Positive True Negative 
• Area under the curve (AUC) represents the classifier’s 
ability to detect classes. If the AUC is 1, that means 
that the classifier perfectly detects class labels whereas 
0.5 is equal to random selection. AUC has been found 
to be insensitive to an imbalanced [31] dataset. 
• Precision is the ratio of true level of positive or nega-
tive detection of the classifier to overall test samples.  
TP / (TP + FP) 
• Recall is the ratio of correct true positive classifier 
decisions to the all true positive examples in the test 
set. 
TP / (TP + FN) 
• F-measure (F1) represents the previous metrics preci-
sion and recall combined as follows. 
 2 * (precision * recall) / (precision + recall) 
Table V presents the overall performance of all implemented 
classifiers using the four evaluation metrics that are showed. 
TABLE V.  OVERALL PERFORMANCE (AVERAGE OF 10 EXPERIMENTS) 
USING ONE CLASSIFIER FOR ALL ATTRIBUTES 
Model AUC F1 Precision Recall 
RF 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.89 
LR 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.60 
NB 0.58 0.62 0.51 0.78 
k-NN 0.80 0.78 0.79 0.76 
 
The results shown above confirm that RF had the best per-
formance, which is aligned with the results reported in most of 
the literature [11][14]. Although one of RF’s main advantages 
is that it does not require a fine-tuning process for its parameters 
[32], choosing the optimized values of parameters could protect 
the model from falling into overfitting.  
The preliminary results show that the RF classifier with 
Scikit-learn default parameters (10 trees, undefined max depth 
and leaf size) reached 89% in the recall performance metric. 
The next section describes two approaches to enhance the clas-
sifier’s performance. 
IV. MODEL PARAMETER TUNING AND PERFORMANCE 
ENHANCEMENT 
 One of the main stages in building a machine learning model 
is model enhancement, i.e. changing the model’s structure or 
parameters with the aim to improve its performance. Here we 
use two approaches to improve the model’s performance and 
11http://scikit-learn.org/stable/ 
decrease its complexity. First we tuned the RF model’s param-
eters and second we trialed several feature evaluation methods 
to determine the feature set that gives the most accurate results.  
A. Model enhancement by parameter tuning 
Although RF does not require high effort fine-tuning, set-
ting proper RF parameters prevents overfitting and enhances 
the detection performance. The RF main parameters [33][34] 
that we considered are tree number, max depth and leaf size 
(stopping criteria) (as shown in Table VI). 
TABLE VI.  RANDOM FOREST MAIN PARAMETERS 
Parameter Description 
Tree number Number of trees in building the RF classifier 
Max depth The maximum depth that the tree can grow 
Leaf size The minimum number of leaves a branch can have 
 
To find the best parameter values for our model, we used 
the Scikit-learn grid search method. Using this approach, the 
parameters could be varied based on a range of pre-specified 
values. All options for all parameters cannot be considered, es-
pecially those that can be infinite, such as tree number and max 
depth.  
In the context of the spam content classification task, the 
classifier performs very well if the number of trees is suffi-
ciently large, the max tree depth is sufficiently high, and the 
minimum leaf size is sufficiently low. The results show that the 
number of trees has a relatively small impact, and beyond nine 
trees there is no significant change in the performance. The 
minimum leaf size has a greater effect, especially for classifiers 
with high max tree depth, for which even small changes in the 
minimum size of the leaf have a significant impact on the per-
formance. Finally, the max tree depth has a significant effect on 
the performance for low values of this parameter, and the effect 
diminishes below significance for depth values above 16 or 24 
for small and large minimum leaf size, respectively (Figure 2). 
 
Fig. 2. Random forest performance using 19 trees and  leaf size equal to 10 
with varying tree depth 
This implies that the number of trees and max tree depth 
should be set to moderate values to achieve good performance 
without an excessive computational burden. A too small mini-
mum leaf size combined with an excessively large max tree 
depth is likely to lead to overfitting (note that the overfitting is 
because of the trees and not because of the forest arrangement 
of the trees [35], [36]). Therefore, controlling the minimum leaf 
size is important, and again it should be set to a moderate value 
to prevent overfitting and excessive unnecessary computation. 
We determined that our optimal model parameter was 19 
trees, a max depth of 24, and ten as the max leaf size. These 
parameter values will be used later in the process in feature se-
lection. It is worth mentioning that all results are the average of 
20 times trials using ten stratification fold validation. 
B. Model enhancement by feature selection 
The feature selection procedure was conducted in two 
stages. In the first stage, each feature in our original feature set 
was evaluated by applying a number of available feature selec-
tion metrics. Secondly, the top k features were chosen which 
should have the highest discriminative power [37]. Evaluating 
features, which is also known as the feature importance score, 
is an essential process to understand the dataset we rely on to 
build models. Moreover, it enables the researcher to distinguish 
between good features and irrelevant features. Eliminating re-
dundant and noisy features could cause performance improve-
ment [38]. There are several existing methods to perform fea-
ture selection, such as the wrapper and filter methods [39].  
The wrapper method concept is based on model perfor-
mance, and every chosen subset of features is used to build a 
classifier and evaluate its performance until the optimal subset 
is found with the lowest error rate. For a high dimensional da-
taset, the wrapper method could be a costly and time-consum-
ing method; however, the wrapper method is one of the highly 
efficient methods as its feature evaluation relies directly on the 
classifier performance. It has been shown [40] that the wrapper 
method achieves higher classification accuracy than the filter 
method. Despite the high computational resources required, the 
wrapper method is recommended to be applied for such classi-
fication problems.  
The mean decrease accuracy (MDA) [41] is ranking fea-
tures based on the decrease in performance value after remov-
ing features one at a time. Essential features should show a neg-
ative impact when they are removed. Conversely, useless fea-
tures should have no significant impact when removed. How-
ever, as mentioned earlier, some features, acting as noise, could 
have a negative impact on the model. Removing such features 
might improve the performance of the model. 
The filter method uses importance measurement methods to 
assess the information content of features and possibly their 
correlation with the target classification. Unlike the wrapper 
method, the filter method does not rely on classifier perfor-
mance to rank features’ importance, making its application 
much faster Table VI, shows the features’ importance ranking 
based on three methods, information gain, Gini Index and mean 
decrease accuracy (MDA).  
The features’ importance is varied; each method ranks fea-
tures’ importance somewhat differently, although there is gen-
eral agreement on the top and bottom, which are the best and 
worst features. In this stage, we wanted to select the top k fea-
tures that give the best classification performance. To conduct 
feature selection, we started by eliminating the lowest ranked 
features from the three ranking lists that were produced by three 
different evaluating techniques. Therefore, at each number of 
features, we built an RF classifier based on the new feature set, 
then compared it to the original performance we achieved by 
using the feature set with all the original 36 features. Our stop-
ping criterion was whenever we got performance that was sta-
tistically less than the first classifier performance we built using 
all features, which was 0.89 in the recall. Figure III shows the 
performance of classifiers against the number of features used. 
Each time we evaluated the RF classification model, we used 
cross-validation to evaluate classifiers based on the recall met-
ric. 
TABLE VII.  RANKING OF FEATURES BASED ON INFORMATION GAIN, GINI 
INDEX, AND MEAN DECREASE AVERAGE  
# Feature 
Info. 
Gain 
Gini 
Index 
MDA 
1 Domain age 1 2 1 
2 Number of digits in link 2 1 2 
3 Number of external links 7 6 5 
4 Ratio of age to number of tweets 3 3 8 
5 Link letters (number) 4 5 11 
6 Number of links (webpage) 8 7 7 
7 Number of images (webpage) 11 9 4 
8 Number of dots in link 13 13 6 
9 Ratio of words to external links 6 10 12 
10 Number of input forms 12 12 3 
11 Number of words (webpage) 10 11 10 
12 Link length 5 8 13 
13 User statuses count 9 4 15 
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# Feature 
Info. 
Gain 
Gini 
Index 
MDA 
14 Number of link signs (webpage) 14 14 14 
15 Number of ad blocked links 20 18 9 
16 User friends count 15 15 16 
17 Account age 17 16 17 
18 User followers count 16 17 22 
19 User favorites count 18 19 18 
20 Number of hashtags (tweet) 21 21 20 
21 User listed count 19 20 24 
22 Does link contain ‘www’12? 25 24 19 
23 
Does webpage have password 
input? 
27 25 21 
24 Link letters (number) 22 23 27 
25 Does tweet have media? 28 27 23 
26 Number of mentions (tweet) 23 22 26 
27 User name length 24 26 30 
28 Is https protocol used in URL? 26 28 25 
29 User name digits (number) 29 29 31 
30 Is tweet is a reply tweet? 33 31 28 
31 Number of URLs (tweet) 32 33 29 
32 User name signs 30 30 33 
33 Is user geo-enabled? 31 32 32 
34 Default profile image 34 34 34 
35 Is user account verified? 35 35 35 
36 Is user account protected? 36 36 36 
In Figure 3, the horizontal axis represents the number of top 
features used to build the classifier, and the vertical axis repre-
sents the performance in recall. To assess the impact of features 
on the classification performance we removed features from the 
three ranking lists, starting from the original 36 features. The 
performance of the classifier that was built using the original 
 
Fig. 3. Random forest classification performance based on the selected features. 
feature set (with 36 features) is shown as the horizontal line 
fixed with the performance at 0.897 in recall in Figure 3. This 
was used as a benchmark performance to assess the extent of 
improvement or degradation in classification performance 
cause by elimination of features. Figure 3 does not show classi-
fiers’ performance for less than six features, as the performance 
drops very much for further reduction of the number of top fea-
tures. The classifier performance is improved as we removed 
lower ranking features.  
The filter methods reached their peak performance (0.908) 
for 13 features for the Gini impurity features ranking list and 
for 12 features (0.907) for the information gain features ranking 
list. On the other hand, the MDA-based elimination of features 
reached its best classification performance (0.916) for 9 fea-
tures. All methods improved the classifier performance and re-
duced the feature set to less than half.  
V. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 In this paper, we aimed to find the highest performance 
model using the smallest number of features and the smallest 
structural parameters (tree number, max tree depth and maxi-
mum leaf size) in order to find the least complex but high per-
forming classifier. First we determined the required minimal 
structural parameter values using all features and then we re-
duced the feature set to the minimally required set. The best 
feature set reduction was achieved using the computationally 
costly MDA wrapper method, but relatively close performance 
(although statistically significantly lower) and feature set reduc-
tion was achieved by using the two chosen filtering methods as 
well. 
 In the social networks, the spam detection task requires a 
fast response to the new emerging techniques and tricks that 
hackers use. Features in this field need to be re-ranked and eval-
uated periodically since machine learning models need to be 
built on reliable and validated feature sets to achieve high-qual-
ity performance. Features that used to be highly discriminative 
can become less effective if spammers change their methods or 
content. Our work provides a practical example of how to em-
ploy parameter tuning and feature selection methods to develop 
a low complexity and efficient machine learning classification 
tool for spam filtering in social media context. 
 We believe that it is important to tune the parameters of such 
spam classification tools and to optimize the feature set that 
they use in order to achieve reliable good classification perfor-
mance. It is also important to report the parameter values and 
the details of the feature set optimization method that is applied 
in order to guarantee the reproducibility of the results reported 
in the paper. 
 For our future work, we aim to conduct a systematic analy-
sis to evaluate the feature selection procedure and performance 
based on the wrapper method using RF and XGBoost13, which 
is a new library of gradient-boosting trees. We also aim to com-
pare other methods such as Random forest, XGBoost, Support 
Vector Machine and Deep Neural Network (DNN) classifiers. 
                                                          
13 https://xgboost.readthedocs.io 
 The source code of our spam classification tool and the data 
set that we used are available from the authors on request. 
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